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Abstract
Hedge funds have played a significant role in shareholder activism in the U.S. They have appeared
quite frequently in the media as the driving force behind changes in firms' management that
generate higher returns on their investments. Nonetheless, many wonder whether they really bring
long-term value and benefits to firms, stakeholders, or financial markets, or whether hedge funds
net returns for their investments only.
The purpose of this thesis, which is written as a case study based solely on public information, is to
discuss the attributes of activist hedge funds and how they differ from corporate raiders and private
equity firms. The case study then maps activists' most common mechanisms for accomplishing
their goals. Finally, the restaurant industry-in particular, Wendy's International Inc., which has
been highly targeted by activists-offers a platform for studying the outcomes of activists'
maneuvers.
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Introduction
The activist hedge fund trend that has emerged over the past few years has changed the face of
American corporations. Whether it is a revival of the corporate raid wave of the 80s, an evolution
of private equity or a new type of investment, the activist hedge fund has clearly impacted the way
management approaches shareholders. The question is whether it has also brought benefits for the
firms it has targeted.
Activist hedge funds are investment vehicles that purchase stakes of public companies that will
appreciate significantly if they undergo transformation. The activists pressure the management to
make changes (such as a merger, a divestiture, or an IPO) that will drive up the stock price and,
consequently, benefit their own investment.
Activists do not need to have a majority vote on a company's Board of Directors to impose
strategic decisions; rather, they offer assertive public recommendations, driving the market's
opinion toward what the activists think is right. Like students with megaphones on the streets
clamoring for change, activists use the media to persuade management to make tough decisions.
Sometimes activists leverage their reputation to effect changes, threatening to go public and state
their opinions as a way to force management to open private negotiations.
Activists have developed from the pressures of a competitive environment. The hedge fund industry
comprises 10,000 peers worldwide; differentiation had become necessary to survive in the business.
The long-short activity sector was getting crowded. Hence, the activists thought the private equity
strategy of "buy, fix, and sell" could work in the public domain.
Some market specialists are idealistic, perceiving activists as representative of a flourishing
"democracy" inherent to capitalism; others say they are speculative, merely reaping huge value
from well-known and established companies to make their own fortunes. Both outcomes have been
observed, and neither is clearly dominant.
This text, which is written as a case study, begins by discussing the attributes of activist hedge
funds and how they differ from corporate raiders and private equity firms. The case study then
maps the activists' most common mechanisms for accomplishing their goals. Finally, the restaurant
industry, especially Wendy's International Inc., highly targeted by activists, serves as a platform for
studying the outcomes of their actions.
Corporate Raid, Private Equity, or Something New?
During the 80s, corporate raiders issued large quantities of junk bonds to purchase big companies
through hostile takeovers. Portrayed in Hollywood movies like "Wall Street" or "Larry, the
Liquidator," corporate raiders encountered increasingly defensive behavior from management,
which used poison pills to reduce the probability of takeover. It became increasingly costly and
time-consuming to acquire control of companies.
In the 90s, private equity activity reached its peak, although the first traces of such organized
investments date from the 1940s. Usually through leveraged buyouts (LBO), private equity' firms
purchased big firms and took them to the private arena-one of the most expensive ways to invest,
since it required financing to those who did not have access to bank loans or the equity market.
Additionally, it required intensive due diligence because of the size of the risks undertaken.
Hedge fund activism surged in 2005 as a new trend promising to push shareholders' behavior to a
new level. Rather than getting rid of the stakes of an underperforming company, activists preferred
to purchase them in small quantities; thus, they could request either privately or publicly that
shareholders' returns be improved by implementing their recommendations. They aimed at firms
that were mismanaged and undervalued.
Hedge fund activism has emerged as a unique kind of business. In contrast to the corporate raid,
hedge fund activism does not aim to gain control of a firm, relying instead on a broad number of
strategies to have their demands fulfilled. In contrast to private equity, hedge fund activism does
not take public companies to the private domain and does not perform thorough due diligence.
Activists possess their own mechanisms for extracting value from their investments.
The differences between private equity and activist hedge fund are highlighted in Exhibit 1.
Activists' Mechanisms
Activists influence the market and their targeted companies through a series of operations. The
following items represent the most observed behaviors, ordered chronologically. Activists do not
necessarily pursue all of these behaviors; instead, they tailor their strategy to the reaction of the
particular company's management's reaction.
Easy target: The activists aim at firms or industries that are vulnerable. They can extract more
value from the situation and convince the market of the changes easily.
Partnership: The activists usually partner with passive hedge funds. The partners may either
explicitly convey that they are investing together, or appear publicly to act independently while
making simultaneous moves. With this strategy, one successful activity may attract other partners,
reinforcing the strategy and creating momentum for quick change.
Smaller stakes: The activists buy small stakes of the firms they want to influence and count on
allies inside the board of directors or on other hedge funds that also buy shares. They usually buy
shares gradually, stocking up to right below the 5% cap (otherwise, they will have to file either 13D
or 13G), and wait for the right time to surpass the threshold.
1 The private equity market also encompasses start-up firms, private middle-market companies, and firms in
financial distress. Source: "The Economics of the Private Equity Market," George Fenn, Nellie Liang, and
Stephen Prowse, Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1995.
Challenge to governance: The activists challenge poison pills, although those mechanisms may
represent a threat to their investments. For instance, activists will negotiate places on the board
even though the firm has approved a staggered board system.
Specific demands: The activists demand a number of situations, which may include the sale of the
company or strategic units, a change in management or board composition, a change in corporate
governance, the monetization of assets, return of capital to shareholders, or influence over mergers.
Market's opinion: Activists count on the market's opinion to drive their changes. The more
reputable the activist, the more power the activist has over the market. If the activists convince the
market that their recommendations are good for the firm, any counteraction from the management
will drive share prices down. Similarly, a pro-activist decision from the management will drive
share prices up. For instance, it was necessary for Nelson Peltz to own no more than 3% of Cadbury
in order to convince the management to divide the firm into two.
Pressure: Activists are challenged to pressure target companies. Unlike private equity firms, they
do not utilize tactics that would force the management to work harder for results, such as
monitoring the firm's day-to-day activities or piling on debt. On the other hand, activists need not
work any harder than private equity firms to get the same results, since they purchase stocks
without premiums and do not battle with other hedge funds for control over a single target.
Restaurant Industry Overview
The activists reshaped the restaurant industry, which has been underperforming and has had a lot of
cash and real estate on the balance sheets. Several restaurant chains were affected across the
country.
CKE Restaurants: Pirate Capital acquired 7 percent stake in April 2007 and made the chain
repurchase stocks using debt, leading to a downgrade in its credit rating
Applebee's: Breeden Capital Management managed to get two seats on the board and to convince
the shareholders to sell the firm, which was eventually acquired by IHOP
McDonald's: Pershing Square Capital Management pushed to borrow against 8,000 of its stores to
fund a share buyback. The fast-food chain eventually agreed to sell 1,500 stores within three years.
In 2005, two major shareholders waged a successful campaign to get Wendy's International Inc. to
spin off its Tim Hortons doughnut chain, a move that helped push the stock price higher.
David Thomas and Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers
Overview of the Firm
David Thomas had dreamed of running the world's best restaurant since childhood. After twenty
years of experience in the restaurant business, and with Kentucky Fried Chicken owner Harland
Sanders as his mentor, Thomas launched Wendy's Old-Fashioned Hamburgers on November 15,
1969 in Columbus, Ohio (Wendy was Thomas's daughter's nickname). By the mid-1970s,
Wendy's was growing rapidly, and the company went public. In 1978, it opened its 1,000th
restaurant. In 1995, the globalized 5,000-store chain merged with Tim Hortons, a Canadian coffee
and fresh baked goods chain. David Thomas passed away in 2002.
The $275 million acquisition of Baja Fresh in 2002 by John T. Schuessler, Wendy's CEO, was
hailed as a brilliant business move by the firm. The purchase marked a turning point in the
company's strategy of investing in the fast-casual business 2. The management believed in Baja
Fresh's steady performance: as the 2002 Summary Annual Report to the Shareholders reported,
"We acquired Baja Fresh Mexican Grill in June after reviewing hundreds of restaurant concepts.
Baja Fresh is clearly outstanding by every measure."
In 2005, Wendy's International Inc. (ticker: WEN) was a fast-food restaurant chain with nearly
10,000 stores all over the world. Wendy's occupied the third-highest position in the world's
restaurant industry in 2005, after competitors McDonald's and Burger King. Wendy's distinguished
itself with its unique branding; for several years in a row, Wendy's was rated the most-remembered
brand in the US3.
Wendy's and Hortons were the firm's cornerstone brands, encompassing 94% of global sales. Baja
Fresh and Caf6 Express, both considered developing brands, accounted for the remaining 6%.
Hortons's revenues were skyrocketing. From 2002 to 2004, Hortons's total sales increased by 53%,
compared to Wendy's 21%. Although the Wendy's division still represented most of the revenues,
Hortons increased in financial importance every year and was responsible for half of the earnings.
The management was not as optimistic about Baja Fresh, which lost average sales per store. In the
2004 Proxy Statement, the management no longer expressed confidence in Baja Fresh: "Baja Fresh
results were disappointing. In addition to closing underperforming restaurants, the Company made
significant management changes at Baja Fresh to position the brand for future growth." Schuessler
did not receive a bonus that year.
William Ackman and Pershing Square Capital
Background
William Ackman is unique among his hedge fund manager peers. From getting emotional over
supportive comments about his ideas in a conference-a situation he defined as a "Hillary
moment"4 -to sending a lengthy letter to Fitch's, Moody's, and S&P explaining to them why they
should downgrade a bond insurer he was selling short, Ackman is a controversial figure on the
Street.
Ackman, whose family ran a commercial real estate firm, holds both an undergraduate and an MBA
degree from Harvard. In 1992, he started the investment firm Gotham Partners with a fellow
graduate. After three years, he became known for bidding on Rockefeller Center. In 1998, Gotham
Partners had $500 million in assets.
In 2003, Ackman faced an investigation against Gotham Partners, put forth by former New York
Attorney General (now former Governor) Eliot Spitzer. Ultimately, Spitzer filed no charges against
him, but Ackman's reputation was undermined by the episode. "People look at you funny," he said.
"I learned that it takes a lifetime to build a reputation, and someone can destroy it in a few days." 5
2 The criteria most executives cite for fast-casual concepts are a perceived better-quality, fresher food
offering; counter ordering; an upscale ambiance approaching that of casual dining; and price points between
$6-$10. The go-betweens: fast-casual concepts fill the niche between QSR and casual by Nancy Brumback,
15 August 2002, Restaurant Business
3 Since 1989, Dave Thomas starred or appeared in hundreds of the company's oft-broadcast television
commercials. The association of Wendy's with its founder was strong and had great public appeal.
4 "William Ackman: Targeting Target," by Chris Serres, Star Tribune, January 13, 2008.
5 "William Ackman: Targeting Target," by Chris Serres, Star Tribune, January 13, 2008.
The episode did not, however, seem to set him back permanently. One year later, he launched
Pershing Square Capital Management with $54 million backed by funds from personal assets and
Leucadia National. Some months later, he bought Wendy's stocks.
Pershing's Entry
April 2005 was not a good month for Wendy's. At the end of March, a woman found a well-
manicured human finger in her Wendy's chili bowl in a San Jose franchise, an episode widely
broadcast in the media for the next month that lead to drop in sales and, consequently, layoffs in
Northern California. After the police discovered that it was actually a hoax, Wendy's had only a
few days to recover before the next public relations crisis.
On April 26, Pershing Square Management filed a 13D 6 registering the purchase of 9.3% of
Wendy's International in American calls immediately exercisable into common stocks. In the file,
Pershing stated its belief that Wendy's common stocks were significantly undervalued. In addition,
it was their intention to meet with management to propose potential changes in the company's
operations, capital structure, or business strategy in an effort to enhance shareholder value. Pershing
also affirmed that it was considering the possibility of spinning off one or more divisions. Finally, it
clearly said it had no intention of acquiring control. Wendy's stocks fell by 3.8 percent that day.
Two days later, the SEC revealed the purchase of a Wendy's stake of 6.3% by Highfields Capital
Management, a hedge fund group based in Boston, MA. Highfields required a file 13G register on
April 18, the same day Pershing made its requirement. Highfields' owners Jonathon S. Jacobson
and Richard L. Grubman were already known for a previous attempt to purchase a stake of the
Circuit City Stores.
By the time the SEC revealed the activists' stakes, the market had already suspected hedge fund
activity. According to Exhibit 2, the trade volume of Wendy's stocks increased in the first months
of 2005. In the 13D file, Pershing uncovered intense buy/sell stock activity for the last 60 days
before the register. Most of the stake was bought through exercisable American calls.
Pershing's Proposal
On June 9, both Pershing and Highfields filed 13D and 13G forms, respectively. Both had increased
their stake in Wendy's. Pershing reported it had 9.9% and Highfields 7.3%. Pershing hired
Blackstone to advise them on strategic alternatives for Wendy's. One month later, after multiple
frustrated attempts to reach out to Schuessler, Pershing sent a letter to Schuessler explaining its
proposal to Wendy's, shown in Exhibit 3.
According to their letter, the company's intrinsic equity value was in the range of $60 - $70 per
share, whereas the stock was being traded at $45 per share. They proposed three steps to bring the
market price in line with its real value: spin off Hortons, refranchise the stores, and repurchase
stocks.
The rationale behind Tim Hortons's spin-off was to unlock its value, which was hidden by the
average-to-poor performance of the other units. Hortons was certainly Wendy's rising star: it
benefited from its place as a unique, reputable brand in Canada, and generated strong free cash
flows. As well, a public listing of Hortons would provide adequate compensation for Hortons's
6 Investors are obliged to disclose purchases that represent an ownership above 5% through the form 13D or
13G. Form 13D states an intention to establish control, while form 13G states an intention of passive
investment.
management and retain talented management. Finally, the spin-off would force Wendy's
management to focus on improving the struggling core business of the company.
Pershing believed that if Wendy's were to spin off Tim Hortons, the total value immediately
available to Wendy's shareholders would be approximately $54 per share-$36 per share of Tim
Hortons stock and approximately $18 per share of the remaining Wendy's businesses. This analysis
assumed that Tim Hortons would be spun off debt-free, and that all of the company's debt would be
allocated to the remaining Wendy's.
The rationale behind refranchising the remaining Wendy's restaurants was to focus the firm's
resources on new product development, marketing, quality assurance, enhanced franchisee training
programs, and improved franchisee performance monitoring. The competition was intense, and
innovative products and well-trained employees were key for success in the industry. Pershing
believed this initiative would create $11 to $13 per share incremental value for the shareholders,
creating a total value of approximately $60 to $70 per share.
Furthermore, the refranchising of 99% of Wendy's restaurants would effect the improvement of
EBITDA. Both capital expenditures to maintain the stores running and depreciation & amortization
expenses would drop dramatically. Wendy's would be selling franchise rights and extract EBITDA
margins up to 30%-much higher than the existing mid-teens percentage.
On July 29, despite announcing the results of a long in-house analysis, Wendy's finally aligned in
favor of Pershing's recommendations. In a press release, Wendy's announced measures to enhance
shareholders' value. The management stated their intention to:
* Sell 15% to 18% of its Tim Hortons unit
* Execute an initial public offering for a stake in Tim Hortons within the next nine months,
and the use of the proceeds to repurchase its own shares
* Close between 40 and 60 loss-making restaurants
* Sell 217 properties it was leasing to franchisees, reducing the percentage of company-
operated stores to 15% to 18%
Wendy's shares closed at $51.01 that day, up 13% from a previous day's close of $45.27. Ackman
was satisfied with the way management had conducted itself, and told the press he had had a good
morning on the announcement day. Nevertheless, Wendy's corporate strategy still seemed
vulnerable, and investors were willing to extract more value from the firm. Nelson Peltz, a famous
corporate raider in the 80s, purchased a large stake in Wendy's on December 13. Wendy's was
under pressure again.
Wendy's Valuation
In calculating Wendy's intrinsic value, as well as its valuation relative to peers McDonald's and
YUM!, Wendy's was found to be undervalued. The total value came to $50.87 per share, which is
the sum of Wendy's division ($15.04) and Hortons' division ($35.05).
Wendy's intrinsic valuation was based on DCF calculation, rather than APV valuation, because
Wendy's capital structure would not change going forward. The key assumptions made when
conducting the DCF analysis are listed below; all other assumptions and all calculations can be
found in Exhibits 4, 5 and 6.
* The DCF calculation included financials for a 5-year time frame, from 2005 to 2009.
Wendy's and Tim Hortons were considered separately in the calculations. The developing
brands were included in Wendy's calculations.
* Assumptions regarding COGS and other line items were based on historical averages.
* The terminal value estimation is based on a conservative growth rate of 1%, given the
nature of the industry product market. Sensitivity analysis was conducted surrounding the
growth rate used in the terminal value, which is seen in Exhibit 6.
* For discounting purposes on the DCF analysis, the valuation was calculated as of
12/31/2004.
* The levered beta for both Wendy's and Tim Hortons was assumed to be the same. The beta
was calculated through regression using data between 2000 and 2005.
* Wendy's received all the debt and cash in the separation.
* Developing brands were not included in the calculations because they represented a low
percentage of sales. Furthermore, the brands did not seem to be promising anymore.
The enterprise value of Wendy's and Hortons was around $6.3 billion. After conducting sensitivity
analysis by altering both the WACC and terminal growth rate, the total value ranged from 15%
greater than to 15% lower than $6.3 billion.
Finally, we valued Wendy's using peer comparable analysis, which is found in Exhibit 7. At the
end of 2004, Wendy's P/E multiple was clearly undervalued compared to its peers McDonald's and
YUM!. Both numbers provide a range between $49 and $54 per share, which is aligned with the
DCF analysis. The same pattern was verified using the Total Enterprise Value/EBITDA multiple.
Wendy's multiples are 20%-30% below its peers: both McDonalds' and YUM!'s multiples provide
a range between $50 and $52 per share.
Choice of Wendy's
Ackman succeeded by choosing Wendy's as an investment. Although he explicitly justified his
choice by saying that Wendy's growing division Tim Hortons was not correctly reflected in the
stock price, Wendy's had other characteristics that might have helped him bet on the company.
Below are listed some probable reasons for Ackman's decision to focus on Wendy's:
Size: As a midcap firm (market capitalization around $4 billion in 2005), Wendy's would be easier
to fix than a bigger firm, especially for a beginner in the industry like Ackman.
Corporate governance: Wendy's sound corporate governance attributes would enable quicker
changes in the business strategy and reduce the possibility of management entrenchment. Shark
repellents such as a staggered board did not offer a barrier to investment.
Leverage: Lower leverage compared to its peers would provide flexibility to maneuver the
company in uncertain times, when investors get nervous and the firm's perceived risk increases.
Ownership: Wendy's shareholders have been institutions in majority. On March 31, 2005,
Wendy's largest shareholders-Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss Inc.; Fidelity Investments;
Barclays Global Investors; AllianceBernstein LP and Cooke & Bieler LP-which owned one third
of the stakes, did not pose a threat to Ackman's plans. As a matter of fact, they reduced their
positions in Wendy's in the following quarter, leaving Pershing and Highfields as the clear major
stakeholders. The stake evolution is shown in Exhibit 8.
Simplicity: Pershing's proposal to Wendy's management would be straightforward and provide an
easy sale.
Nelson Peltz and Trian Fund Management
Background
Nelson Peltz, an MBA dropout and now one of world's richest men, sought to make money as a
corporate raider in the 1980s. Since 1993, Peltz has run Triarc Companies, Inc.; he is the owner of
Arby's Restaurant Group, Inc., acting as CEO and chairman. In November 2005, he created Trian
Fund Management together with his longtime business partner, Peter W. May, who was the
president and chief operating officer of Triarc.
Unlike most activist funds, which focused on companies' balance sheets, Trian defined itself as an
"operational activist." Trian, which held more than $1 billion in assets, filed a 13D form released on
December 12, 2005, notifying the public that the company had acquired about 5.5 percent of
Wendy's through stock and options.
Trian's Participation
Trian's 13D form (shown in Exhibit 9) detailed a potential annual savings of US$ 200 million, and
estimated that Wendy's shares could be worth from $77 to $89 each if their suggestions were
followed. Shares of Wendy's closed at $51.37, up about 15% since the company had announced the
partial spinoff of Tim Hortons in July.
Trian' s plan included the sale or spin-off of Wendy's units and a focus on the restaurant business.
They recommended the spin-off of Tim Hortons in its entirety after its IPO and the sale of Baja
Fresh, Caf6 Express, and Pasta Pomodoro. As well, they advised the company to sell those
restaurants with excessive overhead in order to repurchase shares. They referred to the above
strategies as a way to implement what they defined as "operational activism."
According to the file, Trian only brought their opinion to the public because Schuessler refused to
meet the hedge fund executives. Once they increased their shares from 4.9%-right below the limit
for filing a 13D-to 5.5%, they used the 13D form to convey their recommendations. Weeks later,
however, Wendy's accused Trian of giving them a 48-hour ultimatum to meet with its CEO,
threatening that Trian would otherwise file the 13D.
On January 7, 2006, Wendy's finally informed the public of the company's spin-off format.
Wendy's would first sell up to 18% of Tim Hortons in an IPO that was expected to reach $600-
million (U.S.) in proceeds. Shortly after that debut, Wendy's planned to give its shareholders new
stock representing the remaining 82% stake in Tim Hortons.
On March 3, 2006, Wendy's and Trian made public a pact wherein they agreed that Trian would
nominate three directors to the board, increasing its number to 15 members. The Board of Directors
announced their plans for the coming months: complete the initial public offering of Tim Hortons;
spin off its remaining shares no later than December 31, 2006; examine ways to return excess cash
to shareholders, including share repurchases or dividends; and continue to focus on improving
operating profit margins at Wendy's while exploring strategic alternatives for its Baja Fresh
business. In exchange, Trian agreed to a standstill period, during which it would not increase its
shares more than 10% through June 30, 2007.
On March 24, 2006, Tim Hortons shares (ticker: THI) finally debuted on the New York Stock
Exchange, and soared by nearly 22 percent. Tim Hortons sold 29 million shares, netting $671.6
million for a 15% stake in the company. If Pershing had sold all of its options bought in the
previous year, the return on capital would be nearly 200%. Pershing spent over US$ 94 million
purchasing call options, and netted a gain of up to US$ 185 million one year later.
Ensuing Developments
Events by date
The events followed by Trian's initiative are shown in Exhibit 10.
Sale of Wendy's7
On April 24, 2008, Peltz, through his Triarc Companies, finally announced the purchase of
Wendy's for $2.34 billion, after a long negotiation with senior management. Peltz benefited from a
decreasing stock price, which fell from $32.52 on October 2, 2005 (Hortons' spin-off) to $25.32 on
April 24, 2008 (right before the purchase). In addition, Peltz had the advantage of the credit dry,
which led bidders to withdraw their proposals at the end of December of 2007.
Now Peltz is faced with an enormous challenge: he must repair the company's relationship with
employees, restaurant owners, and franchisees. Peltz complained publicly about low restaurant
profit margins and poor marketing. Furthermore, he threatened a board takeover and peppered the
board chairman with critical letters.
Outcomes
Performance
Tim Hortons' performance has been extraordinary since it was spun off from Wendy's. According
to Exhibit 11, the stock price has soared, doing better than Wendy's and the rest of the restaurant
industry. Furthermore, Hortons' market capitalization stabilized at $6.3 billion, which is three times
Wendy's amount.
Wendy's performance, on the other hand, has not yet improved. Long before Pershing's and Trian's
initiatives, its operational ratios had showed signs of weakening. 2006 was an unusually bad year
for the firm, as shown in Exhibits 12 and 13. 2007 provides a better, more typical picture and
displays some degree of recovery. Peltz will be more able to effectively address Wendy's
operational issues as the company's owner than as an activist hedge fund investor.
Timeframe
Pershing, Highfields and Trian had different expectations when they invested in Wendy's. As of
March 31, 2008, Ackman had sold almost all of his positions, Highfields still kept a great majority,
and Trian had not sold any stakes (Exhibit 14).
Ackman sold his shares during the last quarter of 2005. A look at Wendy's total trading volume
(Exhibit 2) shows that it has not surpassed 5% on any single day during that period (except for the
Trian's purchase on December 12). Pershing managed to reduce its 13% stake of the outstanding
common shares as of September 30, 2005 to less than 2% as of December 31, 2005.
Pershing's gains were huge. It is known that Pershing purchased over 9.2 million American stock
options in Wendy's for $93.7 million in the 60 days before it announced its stake on April 18, 2005.
During the fourth quarter of 2005, the stock price fluctuated between $44 and $55. If Pershing had
sold its shares at the median price during that period ($48.65), their gross gains would have reached
$53 million, which is equivalent to an annualized return of 97%. If Pershing had kept its options
7 "After Two Years, Peltz Finally Makes a Deal for Wendy's-Arby's Owner To Buy The Burger Chain For
$2.34 Billion", Janet Adamy, 25 April 2008, The Wall Street Journal.
and sold them after the IPO in the following year, the return on capital would have been nearly
200%, or a gain of US$ 185 million.
Corporate Governance
Wendy's has always been concerned with corporate governance. Long before Ackman and Peltz
became investors, the company fulfilled the requirements of good corporate governance in regard to
the profile of its board of directors, the characteristics of its auditors, its stock ownership by
executives and board members, and its compensation mix.
In the 2001 Summary Annual Report for Shareholders, the board of directors was proud to inform
readers of its independent composition. Moreover, the Compensation Committee and the Audit
Committee were comprised entirely of outside directors. Finally, the members of the Board had
broad, diverse, and relevant backgrounds in senior management positions. In the beginning of 2008
(Exhibit 15), the board was composed of 14 directors; 4 had been incorporated into the group in
2006. Three out of the 4 new directors had been appointed by Peltz after negotiation with the board.
The 2001 report also stated that the CEO's annual compensation was comprised of stock options
that resulted from a performance plan. From that year on, the performance plan was adjusted to
reflect a performance-oriented culture.
The overlap of the CEO position and Chairman of the Board still hurt the board's independent
reputation, however. John Schuessler, during his tenure as CEO, was also chairman. The Board of
Directors Governance Guidelines, adopted in 2001 and still valid in 2008, clarified that no rules
existed to separate one position from the other.
Exhibit 1: Differences between Private Equity and Activist Hedge Fund models
Private Equity Activist Hedge Fund
Total control over the shares Partial/minor control over the shares
Thorough diagnosis of the firm's situation by Update on performance each quarter
performing extensive due diligence
New management receives pay incentives to Management generally does not receive new
outperform incentives to outperform, except for loss of job
Consultancy firm may be hired to strategize and Financial advisory may be hired to give
execute the restructuring recommendations on the firm's direction
Clear and definite timeframe according to Indefinite timeframe
expected equity appreciation
Calculated exit Activists are able to sell their stake whenever
they choose
Management is aligned to the new owners Management entrenchment may delay the
desired outcome
Purchase with premium Gradual, anonymous share purchase
Close performance surveillance Same degree of information as a board member
Exhibit 2: Evolution of Wendy's stock price and trading volume (Jan 2004 - Jan 2007)
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Exhibit 3: Ackman's letter to Wendy's CEO Schuessler
July 11, 2005
Mr. John T. Schuessler
Chairman, CEO and President
Wendy's International, Inc.
4288 West Dublin-Granville Road
Dublin, OH 43017-0256
Dear Mr. Schuessler:
As you know, Pershing Square Capital Management, L.P. ("Pershing") is an investment management firm that
currently owns a 9.9% equity interest in Wendy's International, Inc. ("Wendy's" or the "Company").
We are writing this letter to express our strong belief that Wendy's stock is currently undervalued and that if the
Company were to implement certain strategic initiatives ("the Proposal"), substantial shareholder value will be created
with corresponding long-term benefits for the Company, its employees, and franchisees. While we have made numerous
attempts to set up meetings with Company management and other Company representatives to share our views, the
Company has denied our requests to engage in discussions. We are hopeful that upon a review of the strategic alternatives
we have outlined in this letter, you will begin a dialogue with us regarding the substantial value that can be realized if the
Company were to pursue the Proposal.
We feel compelled to write this letter now because of recent press reports that suggest that the Company may be
pursuing an acquisition of Allied Domecq's Quick Service Restaurants or its subsidiary companies that include Dunkin
Donuts, Baskin-Robbins, and Togo's(Dow Jones News Service, June 17, 2005). We believe that such a significant
acquisition would distract management from its publicly stated intention of focusing managerial resources on its core
businesses. Consequently, we believe that it would be mutually beneficial to share our analysis with you before you
consider a potential acquisition.
We have retained The Blackstone Group L.P. ("Blackstone") as our financial advisor to evaluate the Proposal.
Under its own independent analysis, and based on certain estimates and projections for the Wendy's business from
research reports, industry sources, and other sources that Blackstone has not had an opportunity to review with Wendy's
management, Blackstone arrives at similar conclusions regarding the substantial unrealized value in Wendy's stock.
Blackstone's analysis suggests that the recent $48 market price of the Company's shares (approximately $5.7
billion of fully diluted equity value) reflects a discount to its estimate of the intrinsic equity value of the Company of
approximately $60 to $70 per share, or a 25% to 46% premium over the recent market price (approximately $7.1 billion
to $8.3 billion of fully diluted equity value) which we believe can be achieved if the Company were to effectuate the
Proposal.
Since Pershing acquired its initial 9.3% stake in Wendy's, the fully diluted equity market value of the Company
has appreciated by more than $1 billion as shareholders have concluded that the probability of a value-enhancing
transaction has increased. However, we believe that Wendy's current market price still does not fully reflect Tim
Hortons' growth prospects or the potential to increase shareholder value by refranchising Wendy's-operated restaurants
and using the proceeds to repurchase shares.
In summary, the Proposal calls for the following three steps to be effectuated by the Company:
(1) Spin-off Tim Hortons
(2) Refranchise a significant portion of Wendy's-operated restaurants
(3) Repurchase Wendy's shares using proceeds from refranchising
Furthermore, given the numerous value creating opportunities available to the Company, management should refrain from
pursuing a significant acquisition prior to a full evaluation of the strategic opportunities outlined herein.
Sincerely,
William A. Ackman
Managing Member of the General
Partner
Exhibit 4: DCF Valuation of Wendy's Division
US$ million
Sales Total
% Growth Sales Total
COGS, Restaurant & Oper. Costs
% Costs/Sales
Depreciation
% Deprec. Growth
Corporate Costs
% Corporate Costs/Sales
Other Costs
% Other Costs/Sales
Operating Income
EBIT
Tax Rate
EBIT*(1 -Tax)
Depreciation
Capex
NWC
FCF
Discount rate factor
FCF
SUM PV FCF
Perpetual growth
TV
2002
2,079
1,540
74%
110
10%
40
2%
166
8%
223
223
37%
141
110
240
2003
2,342
13%
1,787
76%
115
10%
45
2%
180
8%
214
214
37%
135
115
214
2004
2,640
13%
2,091
79%
110
10%
65
2%
204
8%
169
169
37%
107
110
166
2005
2,942
11%
2,330
79%
121
10%
72
2%
228
8%
190
190
37%
120
121
166
11 36 50 74
0.93
69
2006
3,244
10%
2,570
79%
133
10%
80
2%
251
8%
210
210
37%
132
133
166
2007
3,545
9%
2,808
79%
146
10%
87
2%
274
8%
228
228
37%
144
146
166
99 124
0.86 0.80
85 99
2008
3,840
8%
3,042
79%
161
10%
94
2%
297
8%
245
245
37%
154
161
166
149
0.74
111
2009 Note
4,128
8%
3,271
10%
101
2%
320
8%
259
259
37%
163
177
166
174
0.69
120
sales growth rate decreasing 10% compared to previous year
Assuming flat
Assuming flat
Including all the corporate costs
Calculated by reverse
1.0%
1,928
Cash 177
Debt 724
Equity Value 1,865
# shares 113.30
# net outstanding options 4.49# diluted outstandin shares 117.79
0.78
2.0%
8.0%
8.2%
5.0%
10%
7,7%
kd
Target Ratio
WACC
Beta levered
Mkt Cap
Current Debt Ratio
Beta unlevered
New beta levered
Diluted Outstanding Shares
# outstanding options 6.14
average exercise price $ 28.43
stock price (1/2/2005) $ 38.82
option proceeds 63.75
shares repurchased 1.64
# net outstanding options 4.49
0,7400
4,398
14.1%
0.86
0.78
· ~brlC1......................1M -~~`~~ -~~~~ - ~ -~~~~~~
Exhibit 5: DCF Valuation of Hortons' Division
US$ million
Sales Total
% Growth Sales Total
COGS, Restaurant & Oper. Costs
% costs/sales
Depreciation
% Deprec. Growth
Other Costs
% other Cost/al/eso
Operating Income
EBIT
Tax Rate
EBIT*(1-Tax)
Depreciation
Capex
NWC
FCF
Discount rate factor
FCF
SUM PV FCF
Perpetual growth
TV
2002
651
422
65%
56
10%
(89)
-14%
263
2003
807
24%
517
64%
42
10%
44
5%
204
204
37%
129
42
94
2004
996
23%
647
65%
31
10%
71
7%
247
247
37%
156
56
153
2005
1,206
21%
783
65%
34
10%
86
7%
303
303
37%
191
34
153
120 77 59 72
0.94
67
2006
1,434
19%
932
65%
37
10%
102
7%
364
364
37%
229
37
153
113
0.87
99
2007
1,679
17%
1,091
65%
41
10%
119
7%
428
428
37%
270
41
153
158
0.82
129
2008
1,938
15%
1,259
65%
45
10%
138
7%
496
496
37%
313
45
153
205
0.77
157
2009
2,206
14%
1,433
65%
49
10%
157
7%
567
Note
sales growth rate decreasing 10% compared to previous year
flat
flat 10%
flat 7%
567
37%
357
49
153 Given the total capex, Hortons' capeK was estimated based on the number of stores
conservaUve assump#on, since it has y
1.0%
3,494
Cash
Debt
Equity Value 4,127
# shares 113.30
# net outstanding options 4.49
# diluted outstanding shares 117.79
Diluted Outstanding Shares
# outstanding options
average exercise price $
stock price (1/2/2005) $
option proceeds
shares repurchased
# net outstandino ootions
0.67
2.0%
8.0%
7.3%
5.0%
10%
6.9%
Target Ratio
WACC
Beta levered
Mkt Cap
Current Debt Ratio
Beta unlevered
New beta levered
6.14
28.43
38.82
63.75
1.64
4.49
0.7400
4,398
0.0%
0.74
0.67
# not... ..... . t 44..
i~br ap~~rmrnO
Exhibit 6: Sensitivity Analysis
Wendy's
15.42
14.53
13.71
12.95
12.24
16.63 18.03 19.68 21.65
15.62 16.88 18.35 20.09
14.70 111 17.15 18.70
13.85 14.88 16.07 17.45
13.07 14.00 15.08 16.32
36.58 39.52 43.07 47.44
34.59 37.19 40.31 44.10
32.78 I 37.86 41.17
31.14 33.22 35.67 38.58
29.64 31.51 33.70 36.28
Tim Hortons
34.12
32.38
30.79
29.34
28.01
Exhibit 7: Valuation relative to the peers
P/LTM Normalized EPS
Wendy's
McDonald's
YUM! Brands
Burger King
Dec-31-2004
15.6
19.0
21.6
TEV/LTM EBITDA
Wendy's 7.03 10.06 8.23
McDonald's 9.42 9.69 10.33
YUM! Brands 9.25 9.19 10.49
Burger King 9.77
Source: Capital IQ
Exhibit 8: Evolution of Wendy's largest shareholders from March 31, 2005 on
Holder Mar-31-2005 Jun-30-2005 Sep-30-2005
% Of % Of % Of % Of % Of % Of
CSO Portfolio CSO Portfolio CSO Portfolio
Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss, Inc. 10.9 0.6 8.0 0.5 0.7 0.0
Fidelity Management & Research Company 9.7 0.0 3.2 0.0 1.9 0.0
Barclays Global Investors 5.5 0.0 4.0 0.0 4.7 0.0
AllianceBernstein L.P. 5.4 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.0
Cooke & Bieler, L.P. 4.4 2.2 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.0
Total ownership 35.9 16.8 7.5
Source: Capital IQ
Dec-30-2005
23.2
19.8
21.8
Mar-31-2008
22.6
20.3
25.9
22.1
Exhibit 9: Part of Trian's 13D file
Wendy's International, Inc. - A Recipe for Successful Value Creation
Investment funds and accounts managed by Trian Fund Management, L.P., ("Trian"), together with an
investment fund managed by Sandell Asset Management Corp. ("Sandell"; collectively, Trian and Sandell are
referred to as the "Trian Group") have recently acquired an aggregate beneficial ownership interest of
approximately 5.5%' in Wendy's International, Inc. (the "Company" or "Wendy's").
Launched on November 1, 2005, Trian is an investment management firm whose principals are Nelson Peltz,
Peter W. May and Edward P. Garden (the "Principals"). Trian seeks to invest in undervalued public companies
and prefers to work closely with the management of those companies to effect positive change through active,
hands-on influence and involvement, or what we refer to as "operational activism." Trian's goal is to maximize
shareholder value through a combination of better operational execution, more efficient use of capital and
stronger management focus. Trian's Principals and investment team have extensive experience in reviving
consumer brands and a deep knowledge of the restaurant industry. Sandell is an investment management firm
founded in 1997 by Thomas E. Sandell. Castlerigg Master Investments is a global multi-strategy fund
managed by Sandell that focuses on global merger-arbitrage, special event equity, and credit opportunity
investments.
Our investment thesis:
While we acknowledge that Wendy's previously announced strategic initiatives are directionally
correct, we do not believe that management's current action plan goes far enough towards
maximizing shareholder value. The real problem at the Company today is the continually
deteriorating operating performance of the Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers business
on a standalone basis ("Wendy's Standalone").
Margins today at Wendy's Standalone are unacceptably low - at least 10 percentage points
below the peer group average - due to excessive overhead and/or restaurant operating costs.
We estimate that Wendy's Standalone EBITDA 2 should be $463 million, a 68% increase from
current levels, as store level margins are brought in line with the average of the Company's peer
group as well as its independent franchisees (i.e. DavCo Restaurants Inc. ("DavCo")).
Management's decision to IPO 15% to 18% of Tim Hortons, with the balance of the shares to be
spun off to shareholders "if the Wendy's board of directors determines to take such action" (see
the S-1 filed on December 1, 2005), is an attempt to avoid shining the spotlight on the poor
financial performance of Wendy's Standalone and thus would perpetuate a highly inefficient and
costly conglomerate structure that marginalizes two great consumer brands. Wendy's needs to
cease operating as an inefficient holding company.
Accordingly, we are asking management to commence an immediate 100% tax-free spin off of
Tim Hortons, sell all of its ancillary brands (Baja Fresh, Cafe Express and Pasta Pomodoro) and
focus on significantly improving the operating performance of Wendy's Standalone. We also
advocate using the net cash proceeds from these asset sales and other initiatives to buy back
stock of Wendy's Standalone.
By implementing Trian Group's action plan, we believe the Company should be worth
between $77 and $89 per share comprised of between $45 and $57 per share in a revitalized
Wendy's Standalone and $323 per share in a totally separate Tim Hortons with its own separate
and independent board of directors.
1 The Trian Group owns 950,000 shares of Wendy's common stock. In addition, the Trian Group owns an economic interest in an additional
5,417,500 shares, acquired through back-to-back call and put options, which provides the Trian Group with the same economic gain or loss as
if the Trian Group owned the underlying shares. The Trian Group currently intends to exercise these call options using excess cash that is
currently available.
2 Defined as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA").
3 The Tim Hortons S-1 filing (filed on 12/1/05) indicates that a US$960 million note receivable from Tim Hortons to the Company has been
created and will be repaid with proceeds from both the IPO of Tim Hortons and a new Tim Hortons term loan (estimated in the S-1 as C$500
million in Canadian currency). Since our recommendation is to effect a full spin, rather than a partial IPO, we have assumed that the Company
will not receive any IPO proceeds. Our analysis further assumes that the note receivable will be adjusted pre-spin to approximately US$500
million and that Tim Hortons will use the proceeds of approximately US$500 million from new third-party debt to re-pay this inter-company
obligation. With this $500 million, we assume that the Company will buy back Wendy's Standalone stock.
Exhibit 10: Evolution of Events after Trian's purchase
April, 2005:
Schuessler
announced his
retirement from the
firm, leaving the
position to its CFO
Kerrii Anderson.
2006
April 2007:
Trian made a move
to become a pure
restaurant operator,
selling the operations
that are not related to
its industry.
May 2007:
Trian raised his
stake by 6.9%
driving the price
of the stocks 2%.
industry
November 2007:
Trian made an
offer to buy
Wendy's, below it
offered in July.
2007
February 2008:
Farallon Management
bought 6.2% of
Wendy's for
investments purposes.
2008
June 2006:
Standard & Poor's cut its rating on Wendy's
to junk bond. The reasons for the
downgrade were the shrinking cash flow,
higher leverage and more business risk.
Wendy's new rating was BB-plus, which
was the highest junk rating.
July 2007:
Trian emerged as a potential
buyer for Wendy's restaurant
operator, selling the
operations that are not related
to its industry.
February 2008:
Trian wants to
increase the number
of directors and have
6 out of 15 seats.
2005
I
Exhibit 11: Evolution of Hortons' stock price (October 2, 2006 price = 100)
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Exhibit 12: Evolution of % EBITDA over Sales in the restaurant industry
30.0%-
25.0%-
20.0%-
15.0%-
10.0%-
5.00/0
0.0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
-- Wendy's -A-McDonald's -4--Burger King --O-YUM! Brands
Source: Capital IQ
Exhibit
14.U0%V
12.0%-
10.0%
8.0%
6.0%
4.0%
2.0%
0.0%
13: Evolution of % ROA in the restaurant industry
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
-- I-Wendy's -A- McDonald's -- Burger King --- YUM! Brands
Source: Capital IQ
35.0%
-
Exhibit 14: Evolution of the activists' stakes
% of common shares
Holder
Dec-31-2004
Mar-31-2005
Jun-30-2005
Sep-30-2005
Dec-31-2005
Mar-31-2006
Jun-30-2006
Sep-30-2006
Dec-31-2006
Mar-31-2007
Jun-30-2007
Sep-30-2007
Dec-31-2007
Source: Capital IQ
Holder
Dec-31-2004
Mar-31-2005
Jun-30-2005
Sep-30-2005
Dec-31-2005
Mar-31-2006
Jun-30-2006
Sep-30-2006
Dec-31-2006
Mar-31-2007
Jun-30-2007
Sep-30-2007
Dec-31-2007
Source: Capital IQ
Pershing Square Capital
Management, L.P.
1.3
13.0
1.5
2.0
1.5
7.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
Change in common shares
Pershing Square Capital
Management, L.P.
10,243,000
(10,043,000)
416,750
(437,046)
5,105,312
(6,416,016)
Highfields Capital
Management, LP
2.8
10.0
10.1
10.1
9.7
9.7
9.6
7.8
8.7
8.4
8.4
8.4
Highfields Capital
Management, LP
6,305,700
78,200
(413,508)
(50,000)
(1,547,695)
800,200
(278,700)
Trian Fund Management,
L.P.
1.1
7.3
9.2
9.2
9.4
9.8
9.8
9.8
9.8
9.8
Trian Fund Management,
L.P.
5,417,500
1,630,700
215,000
340,600
Exhibit 15: Composition of the Board of Directors as of March 31, 2007
Name
Pickett, James V.
Anderson, Kerrii B.
House, Paul D.
Lauer CPA, David P.
Keller Ph.D., Thomas F.
Millar, James F.
Crane, Ann B.
Hill, Janet
Kirwan, William E.
Levin, Jerry W.
Lewis, J. Randolph
Oran, Stuart
Rothschild, Peter H.
Thompson, John R.
Source: Capital IQ
Title
Chairman, Chairman of Nominating & Corporate
Governance Committee and Member of Audit Committee
Chief Executive Officer, President and Director
Chief Executive Officer of Tim Hortons, President of Tim
Hortons and Director of Tim Hortons Inc
Director, Member of Audit Committee, Member of
Nominating & Corporate Governance Committee and
Director of Tim Hortons Inc
Director and Chairman of Audit Committee
Director, Chairman of Compensation Committee and
Member of Nominating & Corporate Governance
Committee
Director and Member of Compensation Committee
Director and Member of Compensation Committee
Director, Member of Compensation Committee and
Member of Nominating & Corporate Governance
Committee
Director, Member of Compensation Committee and
Member of Nominating & Corporate Governance
Committee
Director and Member of Compensation Committee
Director and Member of Audit Committee
Director and Member of Compensation Committee
Director and Member of Audit Committee
Years on Board
1982-Present
2000-Present
1998-2007
2000-Present
1991-Present
2001-Present
2003-Present
1994-Present
2001-Present
2006-Present
2004-Present
2006-Present
2006-Present
2004-Present
